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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 11-4572
_____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
TERRANCE WILLIAMS,
a/k/a Terrence Williams
Terrance Williams,
Appellant
_____________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
(D.C. Crim. No. 09-cr-00717-001)
District Judge: Honorable R. Barclay Surrick
____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
January 17, 2013
____________
Before: SMITH, CHAGARES and BARRY, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: February 5, 2013)
____________
OPINION
____________
BARRY, Circuit Judge
Appellant Terrance Williams (“Williams”) pled guilty to possession of a firearm

by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and § 924(e). Before his
sentencing, Williams filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which the District Court
denied. The District Court sentenced him to 180 months’ imprisonment, followed by
three years of supervised release. On appeal, Williams argues that the District Court: (1)
abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea; (2) erred in
concluding that the government provided sufficient evidence to qualify Williams as an
armed career criminal; and (3) erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment.
We have considered the record in this case and the extensive briefs submitted to
us. Because we write primarily for the parties, we see no reason to reprise the facts of
this case and the arguments raised on appeal. Suffice it to say that, substantially for the
reasons set forth by the District Court, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Williams’ motion to withdraw his guilty plea after concluding that he had not
shown “a ‘fair and just reason’ for the withdrawal of his plea.” United States v. King,
604 F.3d 125, 139 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)). 1 We conclude, as
well, that Williams’ claim that the District Court erred in finding the recidivist
enhancement of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), applicable to him,
and his arguments addressed to the indictment, are barred by what we find was Williams’

1

Williams states in connection with his appeal of the denial of that motion that he “is not
challenging per se ineffective representation” before the District Court. Appellant’s Br.
20. To the extent that his use of the term “per se” may appear to be a veiled suggestion to
the contrary, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, on a record this bereft of
evidence in that regard, can only be brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See United States v.
Thornton, 327 F.3d 268, 271-72 (3d Cir. 2003).
2

knowing and voluntary waiver of appeal, the enforcement of which would not work a
miscarriage of justice. United States v. Gwinnett, 483 F.3d 200, 206 (3d Cir. 2007).
The judgment of sentence will be affirmed.
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